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prise. Moreover, workers are distinguished by an inside productivity factor. Our result
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asymmetric information. In particular, if information asymmetry is small, random down-
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1 Introduction
Because of inflexible labor employment in the public sector, labor redundancy is a phenomenon
all over the world wherever the public sector constitutes a large part of the economy. In China,
for example, as an overhang of the “low wage and high employment” policy in the pre-reform
era, its public sector is now plagued by a serious labor redundancy problem as it is making
an arduous effort to build a market economy. According to the newest estimates (Economist,
2000), at least one third to one half of the workers in the state-owned enterprises are working
without making any profit. In China Telecom1, which is the dominant state operator in China’s
telecommunications market, one of the most profitable markets in China, it is estimated that
out of its about half million employees, at least half of them are redundant.
The Chinese government has been well aware of the impact of the labor redundancy prob-
lem on the economy and has employed, with the help of international organizations like the
World Bank, every method available to solve it. However, until recently it is still an outstand-
ing issue overwhelming the government’s reform agenda. One of the difficulties in designing
and implementing any downsizing policy is the lack of information on the part of government.
Indeed, the government in general knows neither how much nor whom to downsize because
it does not have the information about the workers’ productivities in the public and private
sectors. This situation of asymmetric information poses a great challenge to the government
and creates serious adverse selection problems. In practice it is often claimed that, when
voluntary downsizing policies are implemented, it is the efficient workers endowed with good
outside opportunities who are most likely to leave the public sector. This brain drain prob-
lem has caused considerable disturbance to the public sector in the Chinese economy. The
objective of downsizing the public sector is to improve efficiency. This requires in most cases
a reduction of labor in this sector to achieve a more efficient allocation of labor in the whole
economy. However, reallocation of labor does not necessarily mean that all efficient workers
should go to the private sector because China as well as other economies still needs an efficient
public sector.
In addition to the efficiency concern, the government also needs to worry about the social
stability problem which helps to explain the preference for voluntary downsizing mechanisms
over mandatory ones. Since 1997, China’s economy has been deeply affected by the East
Asia financial crisis and did not fully recover from it yet. Thus, the private sector’s ability
to absorb surplus labor in the society is limited. Indeed, China is now in a critical stage of
1China Telecom has been restructured into two companies by the Chinese government in 2002.
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transition from a planned to a market economy, in which major restructuring of the public
sector is underway. The restructuring process is likely to worsen the unemployment problem.
Therefore, the downsizing policy is to a large extent closely related to the legitimacy of the
Chinese government and it is no surprise that the government has given a high priority to this
issue.
In this paper we apply the mechanism design methodology to analyze downsizing of public
firms. We focus on labor sharing which is one of the important features of the downsizing
programs implemented in China. We are mainly interested in the impact of asymmetric
information on optimal downsizing mechanisms. In particular, we want to explore when
random mechanisms (which can be interpreted as labor sharing mechanisms so common in
China) are employed. In our model workers have different inside productivities or produce
goods with different quality levels, which do not affect their own utility levels. Thus, there
is a potential conflict between optimality and incentive compatibility. Indeed, when workers
with a high opportunity cost of public production are very productive in public production or
provide a very high level of quality, optimality requires them to spend as much time as possible
in public production. But incentive compatibility requires that they should spend less time
in public production than low-productivity workers. If the size of information asymmetry is
small, optimality contradicts completely incentive compatibility and pooling occurs. It is an
example of the well-known irresponsiveness result (Guesnerie and Laffont, 1984). This result
implies that random downsizing mechanisms become optimal.
Then, we introduce the possibility of collusion between the manager of the public firm and
workers.2 We analyze the impact of the threat of collusion on the design of optimal downsizing
mechanisms. More specifically, we explore how collusive behavior affects the screening ability
of these mechanisms. Modeling the collusion game with hard information as Tirole (1986) we
show that a separating equilibrium may occur in the presence of collusion when information
asymmetry is large enough, even though a pooling equilibrium would prevail in the absence
of collusion. In other words, collusion induces more screening.
The paper that is the closest to the present one is Jeon and Laffont (2000).3 Both papers
analyze efficient downsizing mechanisms with adverse selection. The main difference is that
here workers’ reservation utility levels in the public sector are independent of their type, which
affects only the quality of their production in the public sector and their outside opportunities.
2Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes (2002) provide evidence about the importance of the managerial quality of
government for the outcome of downsizing mechanisms.
3We refer to this paper for a survey of the literature. For recent empirical contributions see the 1999 special
issue of the World Bank Economic Review and Estache et alii (2000).
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Furthermore, we consider the impact of the threat of collusion and of risk aversion on the
characteristics of efficient downsizing mechanisms.4
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The basic model is presented in Section 3
and the optimal downsizing mechanism is characterized in Section 4. Section 5 extends the
analysis to allow for collusion between workers and managers, and for workers’ risk aversion.
Section 6 first relates our theoretical results to the downsizing mechanisms observed in China
as well as other economies and then some concluding remarks are provided.
2 The Model
Let us consider an economy composed of a public firm and a private sector representing the
rest of the economy. There is a labor redundancy problem in the public firm and the principal,
the benevolent government, wants to implement a downsizing program to solve this problem.
Assume there is a continuum of workers of mass 1 employed in the public firm and denote the
set of these workers by I.
In this paper we only consider voluntary downsizing5 in the sense that downsizing should be
done through a process which induces voluntary participation, that is all workers in the public
firm may choose to work full time as they can now with their current status. Assume also that
monitoring of output of public production is inefficient and that an improvement of incentive
schemes in the public sector is not envisioned. So the principal cannot use the quantity
produced as a controllable instrument. Assume in particular that the quantity produced by
each worker in the public firm is normalized to 1 both before and after downsizing.
Workers in the public firm are distinguished by their opportunity cost of public production
(e.g. the expected competitive wage they would receive in the private sector) which represents
an adverse selection parameter in our model. Denote worker A′i s type, with i in I, by θi
which is his private information. The θis are independently and identically distributed and
take the value of θ with probability ν and θ with probability 1 − ν. Define ∆θ ≡ θ − θ > 0.
We can thus call type θ and type θ agents good type and bad type workers, respectively.
Assume workers also have different productivities for public production and a type θ worker
has normalized inside productivity 1 and a type θ worker has inside productivity ρ in (0, 1).
4Note that our purpose is not to provide a model which represents downsizing in full generality. It is rather
to construct a simple model illuminating the issue of labor sharing and the consequences of collusion.
5In their sample of 400 firms, Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes (2002) find that downsizing is voluntary in 41.5%
of the cases. See Jeon and Laffont (1999) for an analysis of the theoretical differences between voluntary and
compulsory downsizing.
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In other words, good type workers for private production are also more efficient for public
production. Another way of interpreting the inside productivity factors is to take them as
quality measures. Our model thus has two dimensions of private information but the inside
productivity or quality characteristic is perfectly correlated with outside productivity. Assume
all workers have the same disutility for public production which is normalized to be zero. We
then have a model for allocating labor which depends on the distribution of productivities in
the private and public sectors. Alternatively, the model can be seen as one in which differently
talented workers exert the same effort but provide goods with different levels of quality in the
public firm.
In voluntary downsizing, Ai has two choices available: he may either reject the govern-
ment’s offer of participating in the downsizing mechanism, or accept the offer. A′i s utility is
thus given by:
Ui =


Up if he rejects the offer
Ui(θi) if he accepts the offer,
where Up(> 0) is the same reservation utility level6 for all workers and Ui(θi) will be defined
below. For our downsizing problem to be interesting we assume Up ≥ θ.
The benevolent government maximizes social welfare:
W = S(q)− (1 + λ)
∑
i∈I
ti +
∑
i∈I
Ui, (1)
where S(q) represents the social surplus generated by public production q, λ (> 0) is the
shadow cost of public funds, and ti is the monetary transfer from the government to Ai. The
transfer ti includes two parts, namely the wage wi in public production and the severance pay
si in the private sector. For technical reasons assume S(·) is increasing and strictly concave
with S
′
(0) = ∞.
According to the revelation principle, we can without loss of generality focus on direct
revelation mechanisms. Then, a downsizing mechanism is defined by
{pi(θˆi), wi(θˆi), si(θˆi)} with θˆi in {θ, θ},
where θˆi is agent A
′
i s report to the government about his type and pi(θˆi) (resp. 1−pi(θˆi)) rep-
resents the share of work hours in the private (resp. public) firm when playing the downsizing
6For instance, compensations are equal for all workers in public production.
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mechanism, wi(θˆi) and si(θˆi) are A
′
i s wage and severance pay received from the government
with a total expected payment to the agent ti(θˆi) = (1− pi(θˆi))wi(θˆi) + pi(θˆi)si(θˆi). Note that
to capture the feature of labor sharing in the downsizing mechanism, we assume that down-
sizing takes the form of a reduction (increase) in the share of work hours in public (private)
production.7 If a worker in the public firm is required to work part time after downsizing, he
will try to find a job (part time or full time) in the private sector. Since there is no aggregate
uncertainty about types, the share of work hours and the transfer for Ai depend only upon
his own report.
The downsizing mechanism requires that the government offers to each worker the possi-
bility of playing a mechanism composed of a share of work hours spent in private production
and the associated transfers. A worker may or may not accept to play the mechanism. If he
does not accept the downsizing offer, he keeps the reservation utility Up; but if he chooses to
accept the offer, he must commit to respect the outcome of the mechanism. In particular,
when the outcome tells him to work only part time in the public firm, he should abide by the
downsizing mechanism by trying to find a job in the private sector and obtaining an expected
wage8 of θi.
For the sake of expositional simplicity, the following notations are introduced:
pi(θ) = p, pi(θ) = p
wi(θ) = w wi(θ) = w
si(θ) = s si(θ) = s
Ui(θ) = U Ui(θ) = U
Denote MCc(q) as the social marginal cost of public production under complete information.
To justify the necessity of downsizing, i.e., to reduce the work hours in public production, we
make the following assumption:
S
′
(1) < MCc(1).
This assumption states that under complete information, if the government keeps all workers
spending full time in public production, the social marginal surplus for public production is
7Alternatively pi(θˆi) can be interpreted as the probability that worker i is excluded from the public firm.
Then, the mechanism has a random component. However, when we refer below to random mechanisms, we
mean mechanisms which treat different types similarly and randomly.
8However, we will show below that payments can be structured in such a way that workers never regret to
have participated.
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smaller than the corresponding social marginal cost.
3 The Optimal Downsizing Mechanism
Before characterizing the optimal downsizing mechanism under asymmetric information, let
us first consider the benchmark case in which there is complete information about the outside
productivity parameters θis.
For the downsizing mechanism to induce voluntary participation, the following participa-
tion constraints must be satisfied for the risk neutral workers: for the bad type,
(1− p)w + ps + θp ≥ Up; (2)
and for the good type,
(1− p)w + ps + θp ≥ Up. (3)
Expected social welfare is denoted by
EW ≡ S(ν(1− p) + (1− ν)ρ(1− p))
−(1 + λ)[ν((1− p)w + ps) + (1− ν)((1− p)w + ps)] + νU + (1− ν)U,
where ν(1−p)+(1−ν)ρ(1−p) is the public production, and, by abuse of notations, U ≡ U−Up
and U ≡ U − Up are information rents. From this welfare function one can see immediately
that there is a potential conflict between workers and the government because the workers’
inside productivities do not affect their utility levels but affect social welfare. Note also that
the allocation of labor depends only on total transfers ti = (1 − pi)wi + pisi and that the
decomposition in wage wi and severance pay si does not matter.
The government’s program under complete information is thus given by:
(P c)


max
p,p,w,w,s,s
EW
s.t. (2) and (3).
Rewriting expected social welfare in terms of workers’ utilities, we have:
EW ≡ S(ν(1− p) + (1− ν)ρ(1− p)) + (1 + λ)(νθp + (1− ν)θp)− λ(νU + (1− ν)U).
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Thus, it is costly for the government to give up information rents (beyond the reservation
utility levels obtained in the public firm) as long as the shadow cost of public funds is positive.
Proposition 1 : Under complete information the optimal shares of work hours in public
production can be characterized as follows:
(i) when θ¯ ≥ θ/ρ, then if S ′(·) is low, p∗ = 1 and
S ′((1− ν)(1− p∗)ρ) = (1 + λ)θ
ρ
; (4)
and if S
′
(·) is high, p∗ = 0 and
S ′(ν(1− p∗) + (1− ν)ρ) = (1 + λ)θ. (5)
(ii) if θ¯ < θ/ρ, then if S
′
(·) is low, p∗ = 1 and
S ′(ν(1− p∗)) = (1 + λ)θ; (6)
and if S
′
(·) is high, p∗ = 0 and
S ′(ν + (1− ν)(1− p∗)ρ) = (1 + λ)θ
ρ
. (7)
Proof: The derivation is trivial, so it is omitted.
(Figure 1 here)
When θ¯ ≥ θ
ρ
, the good type workers have a comparative advantage in the private sector or
the bad type workers have a comparative advantage in public production (see Figure 1i). We
define under symmetric information the following social marginal costs of public production
or social opportunity costs of working in the public sector: for the bad type,
MCc ≡ (1 + λ)θ/ρ;
and for the good type,
MC
c ≡ (1 + λ)θ,
where the superscript c stands for complete information. From the first-order conditions
with respect to the shares of work hours in the public firm, the social marginal utility of
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public production is equal to the private marginal cost (opportunity cost of public production)
multiplied by 1 + λ, because the government must resort to distortive taxation to raise the
necessary money, and discounted by inside productivity.
Under complete information the government gives workers the minimal utility levels nec-
essary to induce them to accept the downsizing mechanism, that is the same status quo utility
level, Up, to both types of workers. Since the bad type workers have a comparative advantage
in public production, if the social value of public production (S ′(·)) is low, the optimal pro-
duction level is determined when the social marginal utility of public production is equal to
the social marginal cost of the bad type MCc. In this case the government keeps only the bad
type workers spending part time in public production. Note that it is a corner solution for the
good type’s share of work hours in public production. Since the good type’s social marginal
cost is higher than the social marginal utility of public production at q = (1 − ν)(1 − p∗)ρ,
we have p∗ = 1. That is the government lays off all the good type workers in the sense of
requiring them to spend full time in the private sector.
Similarly, if the social value of public production is high, the optimal production is de-
termined when the social marginal utility of public production is equal to the good type’s
marginal cost MC
c
. Then, the government requires the good type workers to spend part time
in public production and there is a corner solution for the optimal share of work hours for the
bad type workers. Since their social marginal cost is lower than the social marginal utility of
public production at q = ν + (1 − p¯∗)(1 − ν)ρ, we have p∗ = 0, or the optimal downsizing
mechanism entails that the bad type workers should work full time in public production.
When θ¯ < θ
ρ
or MC
c
< MCc, the good type workers have such a high inside productivity
that they have now a lower social opportunity cost of working in the public firm (see Figure
1ii). That is they have a comparative advantage in public production. The optimal solution is
therefore reversed: the good type workers should work part time in public production and the
bad type workers spend full time in the private sector if the social value of public production is
low, and the bad type workers work part time in public production and the good type workers
spend full time in the public sector if the social value of public production is high.
Now assume the government has asymmetric information about the θis. Moreover, let us
first focus on the more interesting case in which θ¯ < θ
ρ
. For the downsizing mechanism to
induce truth-telling, the following incentive constraints should be satisfied: for the bad type,
(1− p)w + ps + θp ≥ (1− p)w + ps + pθ; (8)
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and for the good type,
(1− p)w + ps + θp ≥ (1− p)w + ps + pθ. (9)
The government’s program under asymmetric information is:
(P a)


max
p,p,w,w,s,s
EW
s.t. (2), (3), (8) and (9).
Under asymmetric information workers may obtain information rents by participating in
the downsizing mechanism. Remember that we define a worker’s information rent as the
difference between his utility level when he accepts the government’s offer (U(θi)) and his
status quo utility level (Up). Since it is costly for the government to leave information rents
to workers, the optimal shares of work hours under asymmetric information are determined
by the optimal trade-off between efficiency and rent extraction.
To facilitate the exposition of the next proposition let us define
ρa =
θ
θ
− λ
1 + λ
ν
1− ν
∆θ
θ
.
The next proposition will distinguish two cases according to the value of ρ. The first case
will correspond to ρ small (ρ < ρa) when the θ-workers who have lower outside opportunities
are also very inefficient in producing the quality of public production. For given ρ, this case
also occurs when the information asymmetry is low. The opposite case (ρ ≥ ρa) will occur on
the contrary for a high information asymmetry.
Solving (Pa) we obtain (see Appendix 2 for a proof and Figure 2 for an illustration):
(Figure 2 here)
Proposition 2 : i) When ρ is small (ρ < ρa), optimal regulation under asymmetric informa-
tion entails a pooling mechanism p¯∗∗ = p∗∗ = p∗∗ characterized by
S ′((ν + (1− ν)ρ)(1− p∗∗)) = (1 + λ)(νθ¯ + (1− ν)θ)− λν∆θ
ν + ρ(1− ν) .
ii) When ρ is large (ρ ≥ ρa) optimal regulation under asymmetric information entails:
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• if S ′(·) is low, p¯∗∗ = 1 and
S ′((1− ν)ρ(1− p∗∗)) =
[
(1 + λ)θ − λ ν
1− ν∆θ
]
/ρ
• if S ′(·) is high, p∗∗ = 0 and
S ′(ν(1− p¯∗∗) + (1− ν)ρ) = (1 + λ)θ¯.
Adding the incentive constraints (8) and (9) yields the monotonicity condition p¯ ≥ p.
Therefore, incentive compatibility requires that the good types θ¯ who have higher outside
opportunities enjoy in the mechanism a share of work hours in the private sector not lower
than the bad types θ. However, this monotonicity condition may conflict with the socially
efficient allocation of labor under complete information when the good types are also producing
relatively higher quality in public production, i.e., when ρθ¯ < θ. Then two cases appear. If the
information asymmetry is small enough, even when the virtual cost of the efficient type which
includes the cost of information rents is taken into account, the good types are still more
efficient with respect to the public sector and screening is not compatible with incentives.
The optimal mechanism pools the two types. This case occurs when ρ is not too large, that is
ρ < ρa, or when the information asymmetry ∆θ is small enough (see Figure 2i). One can check
that asymmetric information leads to less downsizing of the bad type and more downsizing of
good type workers (see Appendix 2).
On the other hand, if the information asymmetry ∆θ is large enough, screening remains
compatible with the monotonicity constraint (see Figure 2ii).
For a low social value of public production, all the good type workers work in the private
sector and the bad type workers working part time in the public sector. If the social value of
public production is high, the bad type workers spend full time in the public sector and the
good type workers work part time in the private sector. One can check that in both cases
asymmetric information decreases (resp. increases) the downsizing level of the bad type (resp.
good type) workers .
Finally, when θ¯ ≥ θ/ρ, the good types are the ones who should work in the private sector
under incomplete as well as complete information. Then, there is always a separating allocation
with less downsizing of the bad type workers due to asymmetric information.
Proposition 3 : When θ¯ ≥ θ/ρ, optimal regulation under incomplete information entails
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• If S ′(·) is low, p¯∗∗ = 1 and
S ′((1− ν)(1− p∗∗)ρ) =
[
(1 + λ)θ − λ ν
1− ν∆θ
]
/ρ.
• If S ′(·) is high, p∗∗ = 0 and
S ′(ν(1− p¯∗∗) + (1− ν)ρ) = (1 + λ)θ¯.
If the social value of public production is low, there is less downsizing of the bad type work-
ers while good type workers still work full time in the private sector as under full information.
For a high social value of public production, however, the level of downsizing is unchanged
for both types of workers. The differential effect of asymmetric information between these
two cases can be explained as follows. Asymmetric information obliges the regulator to give
up a rent to the efficient type. Indeed, when the θ-type’s participation constraint is binding,
the θ¯-type obtains the information rent p∆θ by mimicking the θ-type. This rent can only be
decreased by decreasing p. However, in the corner solution such that p∗ = 0, no downward
distortion is possible and asymmetric information does not affect the optimal allocation. It
is indeed what happens when the information asymmetry is high and the value of production
also high enough.
We observed all along this section that only expected payments (1−p)w+ps matter. Then,
we can choose wages so that workers do not regret to work in the public firm (w = w¯ = Up).
From the participation constraints (2) and (3), we can check that they do not regret working
in the private sector either (since s + θ ≥ Up and s¯ + θ¯ ≥ Up).
Propositions 2 and 3 describe the optimal downsizing mechanisms. The implementation of
these mechanisms can be thought of proceeding as follows. By solving the equations contained
in these propositions, the government defines the targeted downsizing . Then, he offers a menu
of contracts (w, s, p;w, s, p) within which workers self-select themselves.
In practice, redundant workers are defined by job category at each key operational function
of the enterprise. If we have k such categories, say S = S(q1, ..., qk), the targeted downsizing
levels for all categories are determined by a system of equations. The marginal productivity
of each category ∂S
∂qk
is equated to its social opportunity cost of working in the public sector.
A downsizing mechanism which would not pay attention to the complementarity of the tasks
in the firm could seriously disrupt the efficiency of the public firm.
A particular menu is often implemented as follows. A voluntary downsizing is offered for a
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transfer t. Then, a mandatory random downsizing is imposed on the remaining workers with
a proportion p leaving the firm and with a lower transfer t. This scheme can be interpreted as
a mandatory downsizing with a menu
p = 1, t = s;
p, t = (1− p)w + ps for some w and s.
This scheme can be thought of as a large downsizing mechanism focusing on the good type
in step 1, and on the bad type in step 2. With rational expectations the good type workers
know that if they do not opt for the voluntary mechanism, they will be faced later with the
mandatory one.9
4 Extensions
In this section we extend our basic model to consider the issues of collusion between managers
and workers and risk aversion of workers. Our aim is to analyze the impact of these factors
on the optimal allocation of labor.
4.1 Collusion in Downsizing
Let us now introduce the issue of collusion. We want to illustrate in a very simple setting its
impact on the optimal downsizing mechanism. For this purpose we add to the basic principal-
agent relationship between the government and workers a hierarchical level representing the
manager of the public firm.
Abuse of power by managers is prevalent in practice in the implementation of downsizing
programs. Managers often make use of their discretion in the implementation of downsizing
programs to unduly favor some workers (e.g. relatives and friends etc.) at the expense of
others. Actually, this is one of the main concerns that people have cast on the downsizing
programs.
Following Tirole (1986) we assume that the manager’s role is to bridge the government’s
9Recently, the Chinese government, after giving several offers of voluntary downsizing, has strengthened
the regulation of voluntary downsizing and imposed mandatory downsizing (Document No. 8, 1999, Ministry
of Labor and Social Security). This could be rationalized as a two-step mechanism as above. However, it is
likely that the approach was driven pragmatically by the need to save public funds and the desire to limit
social unrest.
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information gap on θi. He has utility function
V = u ≥ 0, (10)
where u is the manager’s reward. The manager is risk neutral but is protected by limited
liability. To obtain the manager’s participation he should get at least his reservation utility
level, which is normalized to be zero.
Assume that the manager is endowed with an information technology under which he learns
a private signal (σ = θ) about a worker’s outside productivity with probability ξ and learns
nothing (σ = φ) with probability 1 − ξ. For simplicity we assume the manager’s information
is known to workers. To make use of the manager’s information the government asks the
manager to report the signal he has received, r in {θ, θ, φ}. The critical assumption is that
the signal the manager’s report is hard information, i.e., when a conclusive signal is reported
to the government, it is hard evidence. However, the manager can hide this information and
report that the signal is φ. When an inconclusive signal is obtained, the manager must report
σ = φ. Thus, the manager only has discretion when he receives a conclusive signal. The
manager’s information technology can be summarized by a table describing the probabilities
of the possible cases.
type θ type θ
σ = θ νξ 0
σ = φ ν(1− ξ) (1− ν)(1− ξ)
σ = θ 0 (1− ν)ξ
The timing of the downsizing game in the presence of a collusion threat between the
manager and workers is as follows: downsizing mechanisms are offered by the government
after workers and the manager learn their respective information. After this, side-contracting
may take place between them. The government then asks for reports from the manager
about workers’ outside productivities. When a conclusive signal is reported for a worker,
the downsizing decision is made under full information; but when the manager reports an
inconclusive signal, the revelation game under asymmetric information is played as in the
previous section.10
10Under our assumption about the manager’s information technology, the posterior beliefs of the government
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Now let us consider when the threat of collusion matters.11 When a good type worker has
higher social opportunity cost of working in the public sector (ρ ≥ ρa), in the absence of a
collusion threat we know from the last section that a good type worker gets an information
rent: Π = p∆θ. When the manager learns that σ = θ and reports this information to the
government, the government can extract all the information rent from the good type worker.
Thus, the worker has an incentive to bribe the manager to hide this information by reporting
that he had an inconclusive signal. To prevent collusion the government must give to the
manager a contingent reward which is not less than the stake of collusion, that is the following
collusion-proofness constraint must be satisfied:
u ≥ 1
1 + λf
p∆θ, (11)
where u is the reward the manager should get if he reports the hard information θ¯ and λf
(> λ) represents the transaction cost of side-contracting.
When the manager gets a signal σ = θ, the bad type worker does not obtain any information
rent so he has no incentive to bribe the manager. Since it is costly to give up information
rents, the manager is offered a zero reward to induce participation and satisfy the limited
liability constraint. Similarly, the manager gets a zero reward when he reports an inconclusive
signal.
By the collusion-proofness principle we can without loss of generality focus on the downsiz-
ing mechanisms in which there is no collusion in equilibrium. Thus, the government’s program
under the threat of collusion is:
max
p,p,U,U,u
ξ[S(ν(1− p∗) + (1− ν)(1− p∗)ρ) + (1 + λ)(νp∗θ + (1− ν)p∗θ)]
+(1− ξ)[S(ν(1− p) + (1− ν)(1− p)ρ)
+(1 + λ)(νpθ + (1− ν)pθ)− λ(νU + (1− ν)U)]− λξνu
s.t. the same constraints as in P a and (11).
Since it is costly to leave a rent to the manager, the collusion-proofness constraint is binding.
after an inconclusive signal are identical to its prior beliefs:
νˆ =
ν(1− ξ)
ν(1− ξ) + (1− ν)(1− ξ) = ν.
11In this section we consider only the case θ¯ < θ/ρ. However, the results have the same flavor in the opposite
case. The threat of collusion induces less downsizing.
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We can thus simplify the program by substituting u = 1
1+λf
p∆θ into the welfare function.
With probability ξ the downsizing decision is made under complete information; otherwise,
the government has asymmetric information about θi.
When instead ρ < ρa, we know from Proposition 2 that in the absence of collusion, screen-
ing is not possible and the good type worker obtains an information rent p∆θ. In this case
the manager has also discretion when he learns that σ = θ . Collusion is prevented by pro-
viding the manager with an incentive reward that is no less than the stake of collusion, i.e.
u ≥ 1
1+λf
p∆θ. Note that in both cases, by the collusion-proofness principle the presence of
collusion is equivalent to the inclusion of a collusion cost in the social welfare function. But the
government still needs to satisfy the same incentive constraints as in the absence of collusion.
To simplify the presentation of our next result, we define (here ac stands for collusion)
ρac =
θ
θ
− λ
1 + λ
ν
1− ν
∆θ
θ
− 1
1 + λf
λ
1 + λ
ν
1− ν
ξ
1− ξ
∆θ
θ
.
Then we have the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Optimal regulation entails:
(i) When ρ ≥ ρa, then if S ′(·) is low, p∗∗∗ = 1 and
S ′((1− ν)(1− p∗∗∗)ρ) =
[
(1 + λ)θ − ν
1− ν λ∆θ −
λ
1 + λf
ν
1− ν
ξ
1− ξ∆θ
]
/ρ, (12)
and if S ′(·) is high, then p∗∗∗ = p∗∗ and p∗∗∗ = p∗∗.
(ii) When ρac < ρ < ρa, then if S
′(·) is low, p∗∗∗ = 1 and p∗∗∗ is the solution of (12). If
S ′(·) is high, p∗∗∗ = 0 and
S ′((1− ν)ρ + ν(1− p¯∗∗∗)) = (1 + λ)θ¯.
(iii) When ρ < ρac, then p
∗∗∗ = p∗∗∗ ≡ p∗∗∗ and
S ′((ν + (1− ν)ρ)(1− p∗∗∗))
=
[
(1 + λ)(νθ + (1− ν)θ)− λν∆θ − λ
1+λf
ξ
1−ξν∆θ
]
/(ν + (1− ν)ρ) (13)
Proof: The proof is similar to that in the absence of collusion so it is omitted.
Let us define
MC
ac ≡ (1 + λ)θ = MCc
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and
MCac ≡ 1
ρ
[(1 + λ)θ − λ ν
1− ν∆θ −
λ
1 + λf
ν
1− ν
ξ
1− ξ∆θ]
as the good type and the bad type’s virtual social opportunity cost under the threat of col-
lusion. The good type’s social marginal cost is equal to that without collusion. But the bad
type’s social marginal cost includes three parts: the first is the social marginal cost under full
information, the second is the information cost caused by asymmetric information, and the
third is the collusion cost induced by the presence of collusion threat. From these expressions
we know that the presence of the threat of collusion decreases further the bad type’s social
opportunity cost for public production.
Case (i) describes the situation in which the good type workers have the higher social
opportunity cost under the threat of collusion as without collusion. If the social value of
public production is low, following the same arguments as in the absence of collusion we
obtain that 0 < p∗∗∗ < 1 and p∗∗∗ = 1. One can check that p∗∗∗ < p∗∗. In words, the optimal
response to the threat of collusion is to implement less downsizing. On the other hand, if the
social value of public production is high, since p∗∗∗ does not affect rent extraction, collusion
does not cause any further distortion.
In case (ii) the collusion cost is sufficiently large so that the good type workers have the
higher social opportunity cost under the threat of collusion even though they have the lower
social marginal cost without collusion. From Proposition 2 we know that the conflict between
optimality and incentive compatibility will lead to pooling in the absence of collusion threat.
However, efficient downsizing mechanisms in the presence of collusion call for separating equi-
librium. Therefore, collusion changes the type of equilibrium from pooling to separating.
More precisely, if the social value of public production is low, we have p∗∗∗ < p∗∗.12 So
collusion induces less downsizing of the bad type workers and more downsizing of the good
type workers. Similarly, if the social value of public production is high, since p∗∗ ≥ p∗∗∗ = 0,
there is less downsizing of the bad type workers. But the impact of downsizing on the good
type workers is ambiguous.
In case (iii) the collusion cost is small so that, as in the absence of collusion threat, the
good type workers have the lower social opportunity cost. In this case optimality contradicts
incentive compatibility and pooling occurs. Furthermore, it is easy to verify that p∗∗∗ < p∗∗,
12It is easy to check that (1+λ)(νθ+(1−ν)θ)−λ∆θνν+(1−ν)ρ >
[
(1 + λ)θ − ν1−ν λ∆θ − λ1+λf ν1−ν
ξ
1−ξ∆θ
]
/ρ. So (ν + (1−
ν)ρ)(1− p∗∗) < (1− ν)(1− p∗∗∗)ρ and one obtains p∗∗∗ < p∗∗.
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that is collusion induces less downsizing of workers even though screening is not possible as
without collusion.
To summarize, the threat of collusion decreases the optimal level of downsizing of the bad
type workers, and reduces the likelihood of the optimality of a pooling downsizing mechanism.
4.2 Risk Aversion
Now assume that workers are risk averse. For simplification we introduce risk-aversion in the
following way. Let us keep our basic setting unchanged except that we modify the timing
of the game by assuming that workers discover their types after accepting the downsizing
mechanism offered by the government.13 We assume that payments have been structured so
that workers have no regret after they have chosen their contracts and discovered their types.
With this modification of the basic model, we can obtain a new benchmark where workers
are risk neutral and the government has asymmetric information about the θis. The relevant
participation constraint is:
ν((1− p)w + ps + θp) + (1− ν)((1− p)w + ps + θp) ≥ Up.
In addition, one obtains the same incentive constraints (8) and (9) as in our basic setting.
Then, the first best allocation as characterized in Proposition 1 can be implemented. Indeed,
since only ex ante participation constraints need to be satisfied, there is enough flexibility in
choosing the wage and severance levels to extract all information rents from both types of
workers, i.e.
(1− p)w + ps = Up − θp− νp∆θ
(1− p)w + ps = Up − θp− νp∆θ.
Therefore, asymmetric information imposes no cost on the society if workers are risk neutral
and they discover their types after accepting the downsizing mechanism. However, the ex post
utility levels are quite different according to the type and this raises the problem of how the
downsizing mechanism should be modified if workers are risk averse.
When workers are risk averse, assume that their Von Neumann Morgenstern utility function
13This case allows a simple comparison with the risk neutral case and ex post participation constraints. A
similar analysis could be carried out with ex post participation constraints and would obviously yield a lower
expected social welfare. It is also clear that both cases dominate the case where workers are uninformed about
their type. Indeed, the stochastic downsizing which must then be used is always a possible option for the
government in the other cases.
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is U(x) = 1
r
[1− exp(−rx)] where r is the constant degree of risk aversion. r = 0 corresponds
to the limiting case where workers are risk neutral as in the previous sections. Note that
if workers expect a level of income y1 with probability ν and y2 with 1 − ν, the certainty
equivalent of their income is
y1 − 1
r
log(ν + (1− ν)e−r(y2−y1)).
Then, the relevant participation constraint of workers is
EC(p, p¯) = (1− p)w + ps + θp− 1
r
log
(
1− ν + νe−r[(1−p¯)w¯+p¯s¯+θ¯p¯−((1−p)w+ps+θp)]
)
≥ Up,
(14)
where (1− p)w+ ps+ θp and (1− p)w+ ps+ θp are their incomes when they have type θ and
type θ, respectively. Only ex post incentive constraints (8) and (9) need to be satisfied as well
as (14). Then, the government has the following program:14
Max
p,p,w,w,s,s
S(ν(1− p) + (1− ν)ρ(1− p))
−(1 + λ)[ν((1− p)w + ps) + (1− ν)((1− p)w + ps)] + EC(p, p¯),
s.t. (8), (9) and (14).
In this case the participation constraint (14) and the good type’s incentive constraint are
binding. By substituting transfers it is useful to rewrite the objective function as:
EW = S(ν(1− p¯) + (1− ν)ρ(1− p))
+(1 + λ)(νθ¯p¯ + (1− ν)θp)
−(1 + λ)
[
ν∆θp +
1
r
log(1− ν + νe−r∆θp) + Up
]
.
Then, we have the following result:
Proposition 5 : If workers are risk averse and discover their types after accepting the down-
sizing mechanism, the optimal mechanism can be characterized as follows:
(i) When (1 + λ)ρθ¯ ≥ (1 + λ)θ − (1 + λ) ν
1−ν∆θ
(
1− e−r∆θp
∗∗∗∗
1−ν+νe−r∆θp∗∗∗∗
)
, then if S ′(·) is low,
14We define social welfare by adding to the social net value of public production the certainty equivalents
of the workers.
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p¯∗∗∗∗ = 1 and p∗∗∗∗ satisfies
S ′((1− ν)(1− p∗∗∗∗)ρ) =
[
(1 + λ)θ − (1 + λ) ν
1− ν∆θ
(
1− e
−r∆θp∗∗∗∗
1− ν + νe−r∆θp∗∗∗∗
)]
/ρ,
and if S ′(·) is high, p∗∗∗∗ = 0 and p∗∗∗∗ is the solution of (5).
(ii) When (1 + λ)ρθ¯ < (1 + λ)θ− (1 + λ) ν
1−ν∆θ
(
1− e−r∆θp
∗∗∗∗
1−ν+νe−r∆θp∗∗∗∗
)
, then p∗∗∗∗ = p¯∗∗∗∗ ≡
p∗∗∗∗ and it is the solution of
S ′((ν + (1− ν)ρ)(1− p∗∗∗∗))
=
[
(1 + λ)(νθ¯ + (1− ν)θ)− (1 + λ)ν∆θ
(
1− e
−r∆θp∗∗∗∗
1− ν + νe−r∆θp∗∗∗∗
)]
/(ν + (1− ν)ρ).
The distortions here have a different motivation than in the previous sections. As the
contract is accepted ex ante, no expected rent needs to be given up to the workers. (This
explains why the distortions are multiplied by the redistribution factor 1 + λ rather than
λ here). As the workers are risk averse, they suffer ex ante from the randomness of utility
needed for incentive compatibility. Then, the distortion is meant to decrease the risk premium
requested by workers to incur the riskiness of the incentive compatible contract. This risk is
proportional to the difference of utilities between the two states of nature, which, since it is
always the incentive constraint of type θ¯ which is binding, is equal to ∆θp (which was the
information rent before) and this explains the similarity of the distortions. On the top of this
distortion, pooling may occur as before if the monotonicity constraint (induced by incentive
compatibility, often called second order incentive constraint) is binding. This occurs under
the same conditions as in the previous sections with risk neutrality and interim contracting.
In comparison with the risk neutral case in which there is always a separating equilibrium,
pooling can occur now if the inside productivity factor ρ is relatively small. So, as can be
expected, risk aversion induces less screening.15
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have characterized the efficient downsizing mechanisms under asymmetric
information. More specifically, the optimal downsizing mechanisms have been characterized
as a function of the distribution of inside and outside productivities and of the presence of a
15The case we dealt with before of risk neutrality with ex post participation constraints can be interpreted
as infinite risk aversion at the status quo utility level. Similarly we obtained pooling in some cases.
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collusion threat. Our results have showed that workers with a high opportunity cost of public
production get information rents in the implementation of voluntary downsizing programs. In
addition, we have given some foundations to the optimality of random downsizing mechanisms
or labor sharing mechanisms. We have showed that pooling may occur when workers who have
a high productive efficiency in the private sector turn out to also have a high productivity in the
public sector. In this case the optimization of social welfare may be in conflict with incentive
compatibility; it changes the type of equilibrium from separating to pooling if the information
asymmetry is small. Finally, we have showed that collusion may induce more screening if the
information asymmetry is large enough. Similar results obtain with risk averse workers and
ex ante contracting.
It is interesting to use our theoretical results to explain some practical downsizing issues
in China16 and other economies. Our theory helps to explain the claim that there are serious
brain drain problems in the sense that many high-productivity people have gone to the private
sector in voluntary downsizing mechanisms.
In our adverse selection model, reallocation of labor should be implemented according to
relative productivities between the public and private sector and it is affected by information
asymmetry. Thus, for the people who have relatively high productivities in the private sector
and if the social value of public production is low, efficiency of labor allocation requires them to
be laid-off first or spend more time on private production. Moreover, information asymmetry
and threat of collusion requires more downsizing of high-productivity workers.
Our results also shed light on the issue of random downsizing mechanisms or lungang
that are used in some cases in China as well as other economies. In our model random
schemes become optimal when there are two dimensions of information asymmetry (they are
perfectly correlated in our model) and the size of information asymmetry is small. Thus,
our theory predicts that random downsizing mechanisms will appear in such cases where the
managers care not only about workers’ opportunity costs, which are closely related to the
cost of implementing downsizing mechanisms, but also their inside productivities. However,
workers’ outside productivity should not differ too much. If the size of information asymmetric
is large, random schemes should not arise.
Another issue that our theory can also shed light on is the issue of regret in downsizing
mechanisms. In practice, it is very important yet often forgot by the designer of downsiz-
ing mechanisms. In China, some cases have been reported that after voluntary downsizing
mechanisms were implemented, workers regret having participated in the downsizing mech-
16See Appendix 1 for a description of the downsizing mechanisms in China.
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anism and asked for renegotiation. For instance, some staff in the China Mobile Company
have participated in the severance pay scheme, in which they were paid a very large amount of
compensations by China’s standard. But a couple of years later, these workers were well aware
of the fact that the remaining staff became one of the highest paid due to the extraordinary
growth of this sector. As a result, they asked for more compensations from the Company.
From the perspective of our model, this example illustrates the importance of taking into
account the issue of regret in the design of voluntary downsizing mechanisms.
While our model develops an interesting theory about downsizing, we left some impor-
tant issues unanswered. For instance, one important feature associated with labor sharing
is information acquisition. Agents may learn their outside opportunities in the information
acquisition process and it is good because workers are risk averse. But it gives also workers an
opportunity to take advantage of this additional information and collude against the govern-
ment. In this case we need to analyze not only the individual incentives of workers but also
their group incentives.
Furthermore, labor sharing has a feature that is related to the role that training plays in
the downsizing process. Indeed, training is a necessary component of almost all downsizing
programs in every country. But its impact on the downsizing mechanisms is not well un-
derstood. In China’s case temporary unemployed workers have the option but are not sure
to come back because they have to pass some criteria in the training program. Thus, this
tournament feature provides incentives for workers to improve human capital, but also the
training process can be seen as a screening device.
We plan to pursue these topics in our future research.
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Appendix 1
Downsizing mechanisms in China:
The Chinese government has implemented both voluntary and mandatory mechanisms
to downsize its public sector. As a matter of principle, straight layoffs are rare and most
downsizing is implemented in the form of xiagang, under which xiagang workers leave their
jobs but are still officially employed and paid for a couple of years, then become unemployed
automatically. In practice the government often makes some special arrangements such as
retraining and provision of labor market information to help those xiagang workers re-enter
the job market.
Many voluntary downsizing schemes have also been implemented so far. According to the
government definition, those under various voluntary downsizing schemes are not classified
officially as xiagang, but only counted as internal transfers of workers. The earliest voluntary
mechanism is called stop paying wage but keep job policy (ting xin liu zhi). Under this policy
when someone quits his job in a public firm, the enterprise stops paying his wage including
some benefits but the job is reserved so that, at least in principle, the displaced employee can
go back to his previous job whenever he wants.
In some cases the separation policy with severance pay is also employed under which
anybody who chooses to quit the public sector is offered a lump sum or a flow of payments
for a pre-fixed amount of time as a compensation. In this case, incentive compatibility often
entails huge costs on the part of the government.
Early retirement is a downsizing policy widely employed in many industries and regions in
China. Under this mechanism people who choose to retire before the legal retirement age can
be compensated according to a schedule calculated on the basis of how long they have been
employed or are ahead of their legal retirement age. As for the severance pay scheme, it may
imply a heavy fiscal burden on the government.
Under the previous downsizing policies part of the workers are able to keep their jobs only
at the expense of the others who become displaced one way or another. However, lungang
policy is designed for the whole labor force, at least as a transitional policy, to share the
limited positions with nobody being completely laid off.
Under this mechanism the government sets first a downsizing target for each enterprise
and the enterprise in turn allocates to each plant a downsizing target in terms of a total wage
after downsizing. In other words, the firm de facto implements the allocated layoff target.
Thus, it is the government which determines the scale of downsizing but the decisions on how
to implement it are delegated to the managers.
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In practice the management at the plant level implements the downsizing target by labor
sharing in the sense that the remaining workers are asked to share with those workers who
leave their jobs temporarily the total compensations allocated. A worker’s compensation
includes two parts: a fixed wage and a bonus. When someone becomes temporarily displaced,
he or she is still paid the same fixed wage as those who remain on their jobs but there is
no bonus which is usually a large part of the worker’s total compensation. The temporary
unemployed workers may come back to their jobs if they are willing to do so and pass some
criteria. Conversely, those workers who are currently employed may become unemployed some
day depending on the rule of labor sharing. In this way the whole staff de facto share the
required after-downsizing positions.
In most cases, some training programs are designed to select those workers that will keep
their jobs in the public sector. Usually all workers are asked to go to these training programs.
Then, workers are selected to remain in the enterprise according to their performance in these
training programs. In some cases, a random procedure may be employed to determine who will
stay in the public sector in the first stage. After some pre-specified period of time, however,
the displaced workers can come back to their previous jobs and some others replace them to
become temporarily unemployed in the public sector.
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Appendix 2
Proof of Proposition 2:
In case (i) in which ρ < ρa, define a reduced program for the government:
max
p,pU,U
EW
s.t. (8), (9) and p ≥ p.
It is easy to see that all the constraints in the program are binding. And its solution also
satisfies the other constraints in the program (P a).
Let us now check that p∗ > p∗∗ if S ′(·) is high, that is there is less downsizing of the bad
type workers. Note that since ρ < ρa, we have
(1 + λ)(νθ + (1− ν)θ)− λ∆θν
ν + (1− ν)ρ < (1 + λ)
θ
ρ
.
That is S ′((ν + (1 − ν)ρ)(1 − p∗∗)) < S ′(ν + (1 − ν)(1 − p∗)ρ) or (ν + (1 − ν)ρ)(1 − p∗∗) >
ν + (1− ν)(1− p∗)ρ, which leads to p∗ > p∗∗. Similarly, it is easy to check that
(1 + λ)(νθ + (1− ν)θ)− λ∆θν
ν + (1− ν)ρ > (1 + λ)θ,
so (ν + (1− ν)ρ)(1− p∗∗) < ν(1− p∗) and we have p∗ < p∗∗.
In case (ii) in which the information asymmetry is large enough, the first order conditions
with respect to p and p are as follows:
S ′(ν(1− p∗∗) + (1− ν)ρ(1− p∗∗)) ≤ (1 + λ)θ (= if p¯∗∗ > 0)
ρS ′(ν(1− p∗∗) + (1− ν)ρ(1− p∗∗)) ≤ (1 + λ)θ − λ ν
1− ν∆θ (= if p
∗∗ > 0)
There are corner solutions for p∗∗ if S ′(·) is low and for p∗∗ if S ′(·) is high. Substituting the
corner solutions we obtain the result in this case.
26

q
(1 + λ)θ¯
(1 + λ)(θ/ρ)
S ′(·) high
S ′(·) low
(1− ν)(1− p∗)ρ (1− ν)ρ (1− ν)ρ + ν(1− p¯∗) 1
Figure 1i: θ¯ ≥ θ/ρ.


q
(1 + λ)(θ/ρ)
(1 + λ)θ¯
S ′(·) high
S ′(·) low
ν(1− p¯∗) ν ν + (1− ν)(1− p∗)ρ 1
Figure 1ii: θ¯ < θ/ρ.
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
q
1
(1 + λ)(θ/ρ)
(1 + λ)(θ/ρ)− λν
1−ν
∆θ
ρ
(1 + λ)θ¯
Figure 2i: ∆θ small.
First order conditions are incompatible with monotonicity p¯ ≥ p.


q
(1 + λ)θ¯
(1 + λ)(θ/ρ)− λν
1−ν
∆θ
ρ
(1− ν)(1− p∗)ρ (1− ν)ρ (1− ν)ρ + ν(1− p¯∗) 1
S ′(·) low
S ′(·) high
Figure 2ii: ∆θ large.
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